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AVOIDING VIRTUAL JUSTICE: VIDEO-
TELECONFERENCE TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Anthony Garofano'
There is no witness in the courtroom. Yet, testimony is being given,
cross-examination is occurring, and a judge is ruling on objections. All
eyes are fixed on a television, as if it were a person on the witness stand.
In place of a human being there is only audio and video. It is as though
the jury is watching a movie instead of a trial, and the witness never
needs to enter the courtroom.
Video-teleconferencing (VTC) technology allows a witness to testify
from anywhere in the world.! Although witnesses can be seen and heard
virtually as if they were in the courtroom, it is unclear whether the use of
this technology in criminal trials is constitutional.2 The guarantee that all
criminal defendants have the right to confront the witnesses against them
+ B.A., Middlebury College; J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law. The author would like to thank, indeed he is doing so
right now, the editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review (especially pull team
four) and the incomparable Ms. Larson.
1. VTC is the use of two-way simultaneous transmission of audio-visual information
picked up by cameras and microphones on one end and communicated by monitor and
speakers on the other end. Courts use a variety of terms to describe the technology includ-
ing: videoconferencing, interactive television, and two-way closed circuit television. This
Comment will use the term video-teleconference (VTC) for the sake of simplicity and
clarity.
VTC has been used for testimony, including trials with international witnesses, that
would have been otherwise impossible before the development of the technology. See,
e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 38-39 (D. Mass. 1998) (allow-
ing VTC testimony from a witness located in Japan at a criminal antitrust trial in the
United States). It has also been used in other procedural matters such as sentencing and
competency hearings that only transcend interstate or inter-building borders, but such uses
have frequently been disallowed on appeal. See United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300,
305 (4th Cir. 2001) (vacating resentencing because physical presence of defendant re-
quirement was not satisfied by VTC); United States v. Frierson, 208 F.3d 282, 283 (1st Cir.
2000) (reversing district court's allowance of VTC in involuntary commitment hearing);
United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating sentencing because
physical presence of defendant requirement was not satisfied by VTC). This Comment,
however, will only focus on VTC testimony in federal criminal trials, not on other parts of
the judicial process. This Comment will also not discuss child victim witnesses, as the law
regarding VTC testimony by such witnesses is well established. See infra note 69.
2. See infra note 107.
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is a fundamental element of American criminal procedure. That guaran-
tee, as enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, does not provide that defendants have
the right to only "virtually" confront witnesses against them.4 Yet, VTC
still allows for the defendant to see and be seen by the witness and vice
versa, and ensures the ability of the defendant to cross-examine the wit-
ness.5 The Supreme Court has long stressed these factors as the vital
elements of confrontation.6 Nevertheless, courts have acknowledged that
VTC testimony may not perfectly satisfy the Confrontation Clause.7
State and federal courts, in both criminal and civil trials, have diverged
in their acceptance of this new technology.8 In some situations, a judge
can easily dismiss or uphold a defendant's complaint. For instance, the
3. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-51 (2004) (discussing exten-
sively the history and importance of confrontation in criminal trials). In the debates prior
to the final adoption to the Bill of Rights, one anti-federalist expressed the fundamental
nature of confrontation when complaining of the insufficient protections provided to
criminal defendants by the federal government:
For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of most of the
States have declared, that no man shall be held to answer for a crime until he is made
fully acquainted with the charge brought against him; he shall not be compelled to ac-
cuse, or furnish evidence against himself-the witnesses against him shall be brought
face to face, and he shall be fully heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to
the security of life and liberty .... Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the
general government, as in that of a particular State? The powers vested in the new
Congress extend in many cases to life; they are authorized to provide for the punish-
ment of a variety of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exercise,
save only, that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be in the State where the said crimes shall have been commit-
ted." ... What security is there, that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain de-
scription of the charges against him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he
can in his favor? That he shall see the witnesses against him face to face, or that he
shall be fully heard in his own defence by himself or counsel?
LETTERS OF BRUTUS, No. 11 (1788), reprinted in I BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 508 (1971) (emphasis added).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the defendant's ability to see and be seen by the witness and to cross-examine the witness
via VTC satisfied the Confrontation Clause when the witness was unavailable to testify in
court).
6. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-20 (1988); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07
(1965) ("[A] major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a
defendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against
him.").
7. Cf. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 ("Closed-circuit television should not be considered a
commonplace substitute for in-court testimony by a witness. There may well be intangible
elements of the ordeal of testifying in a courtroom that are reduced or even eliminated by
remote testimony.").
8. See infra Part I.
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law regarding the use of VTC testimony in federal civil trials and in cer-
tain international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, is
fairly well-established, with evidentiary rules outlining the permissible
use of VTC testimony.9 Accordingly, the court need only ascertain if the
facts of the case in question satisfy the demands of the rule.' °
In other situations, however, such as in federal criminal trials in the
United States, there is no clear evidentiary rule." Federal criminal trials
lack the aid of any rule, let alone a clear rule, regarding the use of VTC
testimony.12 Without a rule specifically allowing or disallowing VTC tes-
timony, there is dissonance among federal criminal decisions.3 Courts
that support the use of VTC testimony frequently focus on the similarity
between VTC testimony and depositions.' Other decisions focus on reli-
ability, abuse of the medium, a lessening of important trial formality, and
the significant psychological difference between a television screen and a
live human being.15 As time becomes more valuable, and as globalization
increases the number of cases with international defendants and wit-
nesses, VTC could save both time and money, and allow the introduction
of otherwise unavailable testimony in federal criminal trials. 6 These po-
tential advantages, however, need to be balanced against both a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and the fact that faster
and more convenient travel now allows witnesses who may have once
been considered unavailable because of distance to appear in court.
This Comment examines the confused state of the law regarding the
use of VTC testimony in federal criminal trials. First, this Comment will
9. See infra notes 31-32, 36.
10. See Air Turbine Tech., Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB, 217 F.R.D. 545, 546-47 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (finding the facts of the case did not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 and
thus refusing to order the use of VTC testimony).
11. For example, the use of VTC testimony was the major appellate issue in United
States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
12. In its 2002 update of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States
Supreme Court rejected an amendment to Rule 26 that would have discussed VTC testi-
mony in the Rules for the first time. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.).
13. Compare United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the
same standard as that for depositions and holding that the lower court's use of VTC testi-
mony did not violate the Confrontation Clause), with Yates, 438 F.3d at 1313, 1316 (apply-
ing the same standard as that for one-way closed circuit television and holding that the
lower court's use of VTC testimony did violate the Confrontation Clause).
14. See, e.g., Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 ("A more profitable comparison can be made to
the Rule 15 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] deposition.. .
15. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., Ronald T.Y. Moon, 1995 State of the Judiciary Address, HAW. B.J., Jan. 1996,
at 25, 28 (discussing VTC in the state of Hawaii, where in the state's first circuit, "case
processing time [was] reduced by at least 50 percent, and, because of decreased staff de-
mands on the Department of Public Safety (DPS), the DPS has saved 2,400 hours of staff
time, which translates to $45,000 annually").
2007]
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briefly examine the beginnings of VTC testimony. Next, this Comment
will discuss the implementation of VTC testimony in a variety of legal
systems outside of federal criminal law. This Comment will then outline
the dissonant decisions in federal criminal cases considering VTC testi-
mony. Next, this Comment will consider how the technology abridges a
defendant's right to confrontation, and analyze efforts to reconcile VTC
testimony with the Confrontation Clause. Then, this Comment will
evaluate how the Supreme Court's 2002 rejection of a proposed amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would have al-
lowed for VTC testimony, 7 and the Court's interpretation of the Con-
frontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington's should affect the use of
VTC testimony in federal criminal trials. Finally, after evaluating con-
trasting rules regarding the use of VTC testimony in federal criminal tri-
als, this Comment will propose a rule that allows VTC testimony only
upon a case-specific finding that it is necessary to further an important
public policy, or upon the defendant's consent.
I. VTC TESTIMONY IN COURT
A. Maryland v. Craig Restrains Early Enthusiasm for
VTC in Criminal Trials
Courts accepted the early applications of television technology to court
proceedings enthusiastically.' 9 While acknowledging the importance of
17. See Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89, 93 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.).
18. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 424 (D.P.R.
1989).
The main purpose of the satellite transmission option is to provide the jury and this
Court with live testimony rather than with the droning recitation of countless tran-
script pages of deposition testimony read by stand-in readers in a boring monotone.
The reading of depositions also gives rise to ludicrous objections concerning whether
the reader may interpret the tone and mood of the questions and answers and
whether the reader may or may not give inflection to certain words or passages. The
PSC [(the plaintiffs)] argues that live testimony as opposed to deposition readings will
facilitate more comprehensive factual determinations by the jury as well as help it as-
sess the credibility of witnesses ....
... [T]he futuristic aspects of the PSC proposal need not be perceived as a
threat ....
." [Tihe Court favors entering the new age of communications technology with
the use of satellite-transmitted "live" testimony.
Id. at 425-26 (ignoring the Confrontation Clause because all the legal proceedings arising
out of the fire in question were civil); see also Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 339
(Mo. 1975). In its brief opinion in McCoy, a criminal case, the Missouri Supreme Court
[Vol. 56:683
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the Confrontation Clause, criminal courts found that VTC satisfied the
defendants' right to confront the witnesses against them because the de-
fendants could see, hear, and cross-examine the witnesses, and the wit-
nesses could see, hear, and respond to the defendants. 20 This initial en-
thusiasm was tempered, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in
Maryland v. Craig.21 In Craig, a child abuse defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a Maryland law allowing the child victim to appear via
one-way closed circuit television to avoid being in the same room as, and
looking at, the defendant. 22 The Court held that the use of one-way
closed circuit television was an acceptable limitation on a defendant's
confrontation right only upon a case-specific finding that such a limitation
was necessary to promote an important public policy.23 While Craig did
not consider the use of two-way VTC testimony,24 Craig's requirement
that a court make a case-specific finding of necessity for an important
public policy before allowing one-way closed circuit television testimony
gave pause to courts considering two-way VTC testimony.2 In Craig, the
Court summarized the substantive goals of the Confrontation Clause:
cross-examination of the witness by the defendant, testimony under oath,
considered simply the ability of the witness to see and hear and to be seen and heard. See
id. The McCoy court stated:
While Dr. Yoong was not physically present in the courtroom, his image and his voice
were there; they were there for the purpose of examination and cross-examination of
the witness as much so as if he were there in person; they were there for defendant to
see and hear and, by the same means, simultaneously for him to be seen and heard by
the witness; they were there for the trier of fact to see and hear and observe the de-
meanor of the witness as he sat miles, but much less than a second, away responding
to questions propounded by counsel.
The court did not err in the admission of this evidence by use of closed circuit tele-
vision.
Id. In reference to the Confrontation Clause, the Missouri Supreme Court quoted an 1895
United States Supreme Court decision, apparently finding the quote to speak for itself: "'A
technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried
farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and further than the safety
of the public will warrant."' Id. at 338 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242
(1895)). That enthusiasm has not been entirely lost by some judges. See, e.g., FTC v.
Swedish Match N. Am., 197 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[T]here is no practical difference
between live testimony and contemporaneous video transmission.
20. E.g., McCoy, 525 S.W.2d at 338-39.
21. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
22. Id. at 840-42.
23. Id. at 852-53 (concluding that Maryland's statute requiring a case-specific finding
of unacceptable emotional harm to a child testifying against an alleged abuser met this
standard).
24. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
25. See infra notes 88, 92-97 and accompanying text. Craig exemplifies one such im-
portant public policy: saving a child-abuse victim from further trauma; the Supreme Court
was satisfied that the state trial court had engaged in the requisite case-specific finding of
necessity. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
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and the ability of the fact-finder to evaluate the witness. M This outline
has been an important element of federal criminal jurisprudence regard-
ing VTC testimony.2 After the Craig decision, VTC testimony was no
longer an easy replacement for the testimony of a physically present wit-
ness; instead, it became a question of constitutional rights.2
B. VTC Outside of the Federal Courts
Jurisdictions outside the federal court system employ VTC testimony in
a fairly unrestricted manner. When weighing the importance of hearing
all the evidence against the weaknesses of VTC testimony as compared to
the testimony of physically present witnesses, many non-federal courts
take a very liberal approach toward allowing VTC testimony.' The In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia exemplifies this
attitude." The founding statute of the International Criminal Court re-
flects a similar attitude. 2 And this willingness to use VTC technology is
not limited to foreign courts. For instance, in 2002, the Michigan legisla-
ture created a "cyber court."33 The authorizing statute requires "all hear-
ings and proceedings to be conducted by means of electronic communica-
tions, including, but not limited to, video and audio conferencing." 34 This
26. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 79 F. App'x 813, 820-21 (6th Cir. 2003). In
deciding whether VTC testimony violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the
Sixth Circuit looked to the goals of the Confrontation Clause, as reiterated from a line of
Supreme Court cases in Craig. Id. Following Craig closely, the court listed these goals as
(1) ensuring testimony was given under oath; (2) guaranteeing an opportunity for cross-
examination; (3) ensuring the ability of the fact-finder to evaluate the trustworthiness of
the witness; and (4) reducing the likelihood that a witness might incorrectly accuse an
innocent defendant. Id. (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46).
28. See infra notes 88, 92-97 and accompanying text. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure also came to reflect the general understanding that VTC testimony was less than
equivalent to live, in-court testimony. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., State v. Sewell, 595 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (extending the
Minnesota criminal rule of procedure regarding depositions to allow for VTC testimony);
Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1, Decision on Defence Motions for Video-
Conference Link (Apr. 29, 1998) (holding that fairness to defendants allowed use of VTC
testimony from witnesses unwilling or unable to travel for good reasons).
30. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
31. See, e.g., Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1.
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (1998) (allowing the use of VTC testimony).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.8001 (West Supp. 2006).
34. Id. § 600.8011(3). Unfortunately for this experiment, a loss of funding and irrec-
oncilable differences over the court's nature and location (e.g., partially physical versus
purely electronic) led to an abandonment of the project. E-mail from Marcus Dobek, Dir.,
Judicial Info. Sys., Mich. Supreme Court to author (Nov. 3, 2005, 18:10:00 EST) (on file
with Catholic University Law Review); see also Phillip L. Ellison, Cyber Court: A Law but




effort stands as an extreme example of the enthusiasm for VTC technol-
ogy outside the federal courts.
C. Live Remote Testimony and Federal Civil Law
In federal civil trials, to which the Confrontation Clause does not ap-
ply,35 Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls any motion
to use VTC testimony.& In Air Turbine Technology, Inc. v. Atlas Copco
A, 37 the District Court for the Southern District of Florida carefully in-
terpreted the requirements of this rule.3 ' The plaintiff, Air Turbine
Technology, moved for the district court to compel the defendant, Atlas
Copco AB, to provide witnesses via VTC.3 While acknowledging that
Rule 43 allows for remote testimony by contemporaneous transmission,
the court stressed the rule's requirement of "'good cause shown in com-
pelling circumstances."'0 While concluding that it lacked the power to
compel testimony from foreign witnesses, such as the defendant's, 41 the
court again emphasized the requirement of compelling circumstances.42
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the use of depositions,
instead of VTC, gave the defendant a tactical advantage43 and held that
advantage or disadvantage in litigation does not satisfy the compelling
circumstances requirement.44 The court in Air Turbine stressed that not
only could it not force foreign witnesses to testify, but that the compelling
circumstances requirement had not been satisfied, and thus denied the
plaintiff's VTC motion.45
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... "(emphasis added)).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) ("The court may, for good cause shown in compelling cir-
cumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presentation of testimony in open
court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.").
37. 217 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
38. Id. at 546-47.
39. Id. at 546.
40. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a)).
41. Id. The court cited In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 129 F.R.D.
424, 425 (D.P.R. 1990), which held that VTC testimony could be compelled, but found this
case unpersuasive, as it was unable to find a single additional case supporting the proposi-
tion that compelling VTC testimony was any different from compelling in-court testimony.
Air Turbine, 217 F.R.D. at 546. Moreover, as courts cannot compel non-United States
citizens living outside the United States to testify by normal means, the court held it did
not have the power to compel such witnesses to testify by VTC. Id. (citing Gillars v.
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that aliens residing outside the
United States cannot be compelled to testify)).
42. Air Turbine, 217 F.R.D. at 545.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 546-47.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
Other courts in federal civil litigation, however, have downplayed the
compelling circumstances requirement. 6 For instance, in FTC v. Swedish
Match North America,47 the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia relied on a series of Ninth Circuit decisions that ignored the Rule 43
requirement of good cause in compelling circumstances to hold that re-
quiring a witness to travel from Oklahoma to Washington, D.C. was a
sufficiently serious inconvenience to satisfy Rule 43.48 The court focused
entirely on good cause and failed to even mention the compelling cir-
cumstances requirement-save for a footnote that simply quoted the en-
tirety of Rule 43(a)50 The Swedish Match court emphasized its favorable
attitude toward VTC after its brief discussion of Rule 43.51 The court
stressed the superiority of VTC testimony over depositions, asserting that
"there is no practical difference between live testimony and contempora-
neous video transmission," and claiming that the advisory committee
notes to Rule 43 were too hostile to VTC, and as such, the court would
disregard them.52
A recent Ninth Circuit case reiterates the Circuit's approval of remote
testimony, and appears to be the first time the Circuit considered civil
VTC testimony specifically.53 In Adam v. Carvalho, the Ninth Circuit
made no mention of the Rule 43 requirement of good cause in compelling
circumstances and only inquired whether the witness who testified via
46. See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
47. 197 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2000).
48. Id. at 2-3 (discussing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000); Alder-
man v. SEC, 104 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1997); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield
Publ'ns, 756 F. Supp. 1393 (D. Or. 1990), affd sub nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
Goss, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993)). In Beltran-Tirado, the Ninth Circuit held that tele-
phonic testimony was acceptable in immigration proceedings because it afforded sufficient
cross-examination of a sworn witness, and also noted that it would be acceptable in civil
proceedings under Rule 43. Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1186. Three years earlier, in Al-
derman, the Ninth Circuit permitted the use of remote testimony without any mention of
good cause or compelling circumstances, focusing instead only on the reliability of the
testimony given by telephone. Alderman, 104 F.3d at 288 n.4. In Official Airline Guides,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon overruled objections against telephonic
testimony from witnesses in the United Kingdom, finding that Rule 43 was satisfied be-
cause "the telephone testimony was made in open court and under oath." Official Airline
Guides, 756 F. Supp. at 1398 n.2. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, making no men-
tion of the district court's failure to consider Rule 43's good cause and compelling circum-
stances requirements. Official Airline Guides, 6 F.3d at 1385-86.
49. Swedish Match, 197 F.R.D. at 2.
50. Id. at2n.1.
51. Id. at2.
52. Id. (citing Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1186).
53. Adam v. Carvalho, 138 F. App'x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit quickly
dismissed the civil rights appeal of the plaintiff, who had argued that his civil rights had
been violated when the defendants' attorney had been allowed to discriminate against
white jurors in voir dire. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 56:683
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VTC was out of state and subject to cross-examination. 4 This case reem-
phasizes the Ninth Circuit's willingness to ignore the compelling circum-
stance requirement of Rule 43 and focus instead on the witness' taking of
an oath, subjection to cross-examination, and out-of-state location. 5
Even this brief examination of federal civil cases illustrates that despite
a federal rule of civil procedure clearly on point federal courts still dis-
agree about the proper use of VTC testimony in civil litigation. Unfortu-
nately, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have any rule
regarding the use of VTC whatsoever. 6 If a seemingly clear rule of civil
procedure can still lead to dissonance among the federal courts, the lack
of consistency in both reasoning and result in federal criminal cases
should come as little surprise.57
D. Dissonant VTC Decisions in Federal Criminal Trials
A defendant's right to confront witnesses is guaranteed by the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The application of this
right, however, has not been so clear. 9 The Supreme Court once again
highlighted this point in Crawford v. Washington.60
Before Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was viewed as, ultimately,
a substantive guarantee that all testimony against a defendant was reli-
able.61 When federal courts evaluated VTC testimony in criminal cases
before Crawford, they understood that satisfaction of the Confrontation
Clause depended on ensuring reliable testimony.62 The Crawford Court,
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. ("Because [the witness] was a sworn, out-of-state witness, and his testimony
was subject to cross-examination, the videoconference complied with the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a).").
56. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Part I.D.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... ").
59. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
60. Id. ("Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.").
61. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, quoted from a succession of cases that emphasized that the fundamental
goal of the Confrontation Clause is assuring the reliability of witness testimony. See, e.g.,
id. ("[T]he right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliabil-
ity in a criminal trial .... " (alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 739 (1987))); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) ("[T]he confrontation
guarantee serves. .. symbolic goals ... [and] promotes reliability .. "); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74,89 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to
advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal
trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the [testimony]."' (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970))).
62. Until the Crawford decision in 2004, courts maintained an interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause that was ultimately concerned with reliability. See Crawford, 541
20071
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however, held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was a
purely procedural guarantee, one demanding actual confrontation, and
not a guarantee into which one could read substantive goals such as reli-
ability, in subversion of the procedural guarantee. 63 Crawford also held
that where a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, prior testimonial
statements of that witness are admissible only if the defendant "had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine" the witness.6 Crawford profoundly
changed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and thus the jurisprudence
of VTC testimony,6 but there is disagreement about the extent of Craw-
ford's impact on VTC; this is well illustrated by the warring footnotes of
the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Yates.66
Even before Crawford, however, there was significant controversy re-
garding the implementation of VTC testimony in federal criminal trials.67
With neither clear Supreme Court precedent nor an easily applicable
federal rule of criminal procedure, the federal courts have diverged sig-
nificantly on their concerns with VTC, the authority on which they have
relied, and, ultimately, the results of their VTC decisions.6
U.S. at 40-42; see also United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Shabazz, 52 M. 585,592-94 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 ("To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It com-
mands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner
64. Id. at 59.
65. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1329-33 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Marcus, J., dissenting) (arguing that (1) Crawford distinguishes between testimony by
witnesses available to appear in court and witnesses who are unavailable; (2) Crawford
only requires cross-examination for unavailable witnesses; (3) witnesses who testify via
VTC are unavailable as defined in Crawford; and, thus, (4) VTC testimony is constitu-
tional because the defendant can cross-examine the witness); see also id. at 1326-27
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
66. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314 n.4; id. at 1327 n.11 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); id. at 1330 n.2
(Marcus, J., dissenting).
67. See infra Part I.D.1.
68. See infra Part I.D.1.
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1. Different Concerns, Different Rules, Different Results6 9
In United States v. Shabazz,70 reliability was the fundamental issue in
the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals discussion of VTC
testimony.7' In Shabazz, the government's key witness testified from
California via VTC in a maiming and drug distribution court-martial in
Japan, as she was unwilling to return to Japan because of physical safety
concerns. 72 The defendant alleged on appeal that this key witness had
been coached during her testimony via VTC and that recordings of her
testimony proved this to be the case.73 The appellate court found that the
trial judge had failed to ensure the reliability of the VTC testimony, and
held that VTC testimony is constitutionally inadmissible without a guar-
69. Discussion of VTC testimony in the federal courts frequently occurs, as in Craig,
in the context of child abuse cases. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). However,
unlike the federal criminal cases discussed in this subsection, Congress has established a
statute governing the use of VTC testimony in child abuse cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(2000). Because this Comment examines the proper rule to be used for VTC testimony in
federal criminal trials, it will generally avoid child abuse cases because the question has
already been answered in that particular context and further examination would be fruit-
less. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Eighth Circuit has looked to Craig for guid-
ance when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3509. See United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 552
(8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit has held that the Craig standard applies regardless of
the two-way or one-way nature of the VTC testimony in child abuse cases. Id. at 554.
Thus, the circuit expressly disregarded Gigante's distinction between the one-way and two-
way forms of VTC. Id. at 554-55 (citing Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81). Furthermore, the Eighth
Circuit has expressed the same concerns as many other courts regarding VTC, such as the
psychological impact of testimony via television and the more practical, logistical chal-
lenges. Id. ("[A] defendant watching a witness through a monitor will not have the same
truth-inducing effect as an unmediated gaze across the courtroom .... [Assuming] a two-
way system might conceivably capture the essence of the face-to-face confrontation ...
whether it actually did would turn on... a myriad of hard logistical questions .... "). In-
deed, the Eighth Circuit has hewed so strongly to the Craig standard that it has held that
18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i) is unconstitutional because it allows the use of VTC testimony
whenever the child is unable to testify because of an unspecified fear rather than the spe-
cific harmful fear of the defendant required by Craig. See id. at 553. Although the Eighth
Circuit has only discussed VTC testimony in the context of child abuse cases, Bordeaux
suggests strongly that, like the Eleventh Circuit in Yates, the Eighth Circuit would look to
the Craig rule when deciding the constitutionality of VTC testimony in all federal criminal
trials. Id. at 554 ("[A] 'confrontation' via a two-way closed circuit television is not consti-
tutionally equivalent to a face-to-face confrontation.").
70. 52 M.J. 585 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
71. See id. at 594. Although the American military justice system certainly incorpo-
rates rules different from the civilian criminal justice system, at the time of Shabazz the
military rules and the civilian rules of procedure were substantially identical regarding
VTC testimony-they both were (and remain so up to this point) silent on the issue.
Compare R.C.M. 914A (allowing remote testimony by children under limited circum-
stances, but silent regarding adult remote testimony), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (remaining
silent regarding the use of remote testimony after the failure of the proposed Rule 26(b)).
72. Shabazz, 52 M.J. at 590-91.
73. Id. at 588.
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antee of reliability. The court concluded that the trial judge had failed
to protect the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, and set aside the
portion of the conviction related to the VTC testimony.7' Notably, the
court assumed that the standard that must be met for using VTC testi-
mony is one of necessity.7 6 The Shabazz court's primary concern, how-
ever, and the focus of its decision, was the fundamental importance of
reliability when evaluating VTC testimony.
In United States v. Gigante, the Second Circuit joined other courts in
evaluating the propriety of VTC testimony. The district court had held
a hearing to determine if VTC was appropriate to use for a witness who
was both fatally ill and in the Federal Witness Protection Program.79 The
district court was satisfied that the government had proven by clear and
convincing evidence the need for the witness to testify by VTC.8° On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that Craig required a case-specific finding of
necessity to further an important public policy whenever a defendant's
Confrontation Clause right is being limited and that the district court's
test was insufficient.8 ' The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that Craig
applied only to one-way video and that the use of two-way VTC distin-
guished the instant case from Craig.n The Second Circuit instead focused
on Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and reasoned
that the exceptional circumstances requirement for Rule 15 depositions
should be extended to VTC testimony.0 Satisfied with the lower court's
finding of exceptional circumstances, the Second Circuit held that the use
of VTC testimony in Gigante was proper.84 Moreover, the court stated
74. Id. at 594. This focus on reliability reflects the pre-Crawford emphasis on the
substantive goals of the Confrontation Clause. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text.
75. Shabazz, 52 M.J. at 594-95.
76. See id. at 594 (indicating that judges should consider several criteria in "determin-
ing whether denial of face-to-face confrontation at trial is necessary to further an impor-
tant public policy").
77. Id. ("Not knowing the extent of the taint upon her testimony, and Mrs. White
being the key witness to the maiming charge, we cannot find harmless error in this case.
Finding material prejudice to a substantial right of the appellant, we will provide
relief....").
78. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 78-82 (2d Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 79.
80. Id. at 79-80.
81. See id. at 80-81. For a discussion of Craig, see supra Part I.A.
82. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 80-81.
83. Id. at 81; see infra note 134.
84. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81-82. The Second Circuit used a two-part test for excep-
tional circumstances: "'It is well-settled that the "exceptional circumstances" required to
justify the deposition of a prospective witness are present if that witness's testimony is
material to the case and if the witness is unavailable to appear at trial."' Id. at 81 (quoting
United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court made no explicit
mention of materiality, and emphasized the fatal illness of the VTC witness in determining
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that VTC testimony better protected the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights than the legally available alternative, a deposition." Al-
though the Second Circuit held that VTC testimony in this particular
situation did not violate the defendant's rights, it did note that VTC tes-
timony should not be a frequent replacement for in-court testimony. 8
In United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, the government prosecuted
a Japanese fax paper manufacturer for price-fixing and moved to allow a
witness to either testify via VTC or give a videotaped deposition." The
District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed testimony to be
taken by VTC after both parties consented, but expressed "serious con-
cerns" about the use of the technology." The court emphasized that wit-
nesses would only be present via a television screen, which would lack the
unavailability. Id. at 81-82. "Unavailability is defined by reference to Rule 804(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which includes situations in which a witness 'is unable to be
present or to testify at the hearing because of... physical or mental illness or infirmity."'
Id. at 81 (omission in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4)).
85. Id. at 81 (noting that VTC allowed the jury to weigh the witness' credibility by
observation, which would have been impossible with only a deposition).
86. Id. After discussing the superiority of VTC testimony over depositions despite
certain limitations of VTC, the court emphasized:
Closed-circuit television should not be considered a commonplace substitute for in-
court testimony by a witness. There may well be intangible elements of the ordeal of
testifying in a courtroom that are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony.
However, two-way closed-circuit television testimony does not necessarily violate the
Sixth Amendment. Because this procedure may provide at least as great protection of
confrontation rights as Rule 15 [depositions], we decline to adopt a stricter standard
for its use than the standard articulated by Rule 15.
Id.
87. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 38-39 (D. Mass. 1998).
The defendant, Nippon Paper Industries, Co. (NPI), objected to the use of videotaped
depositions, arguing that their use would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 39.
In affirming that the defendant Japanese corporation was entitled to Confrontation Clause
rights, the district court explained that NPI, "a Japanese corporation, is charged in a U.S.
federal court with a criminal antitrust violation. As such, it is entitled to the same rights of
confrontation as any U.S. defendant." Id. at 40. The court emphasized that depositions
were rare, occurring only in "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 41 (quoting FED. R. CRIM.
P. 15(a)). The court asserted that the use of depositions in place of live testimony should
remain exceptional lest "trial by deposition ... substitute for trial by confrontation, pre-
cisely what the Confrontation Clause was designed to avoid." Id. (citing Stoner v. Sow-
ders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993)). Holding that the need of the government to success-
fully prosecute a case did not satisfy the exceptional circumstances requirement, the court
decided that no videotaped depositions would occur in Nippon. Id. at 42.
88. Id. The district judge acknowledged that "[d]espite the acceptance of... [such]
testimony in certain, particularized cases, these issues might have counseled rejecting video
teleconferencing had the defendant not effectively waived its objections. NPI, after all,
agreed with video teleconferencing of witnesses. Thus, the ultimate propriety of video
teleconferencing did not need to be resolved." Id. at 42-43 (referring to Craig and Gigante
as cases in which VTC testimony was accepted).
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impact of testimony by a physically present witness. 9 Despite this con-
cern, the court allowed the VTC testimony because the defendant had
"waived the principal components of its Confrontation Clause rights by
agreeing to the appearance of witnesses through a videoscreen," but
noted that without this waiver the VTC testimony may not have been
allowed. 90 This statement suggests that if the defendant had not con-
sented, the court would have held VTC to be a violation of the defen-
dant's Confrontation Clause rights.9'
While the Nippon court hinted that VTC testimony might violate a de-
fendant's Confrontation Clause rights, the Eleventh Circuit held explic-
itly that such testimony violated the defendants' right to confrontation in
United States v. Yates. 92 In Yates, two Australian witnesses were unwilling
89. Id. at 42 & n.9. "Studies have suggested that television and videoscreens necessar-
ily present antiseptic, watered down versions of reality. Much of the interaction of the
courtroom is missed." Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).
The court also related a valuable anecdote regarding the lessened ability of jurors to
evaluate witnesses when testimony is only via VTC:
In a telling scene in the movie "Twelve Angry Men," the jurors were discussing the
testimony of an old man who claimed to have heard a fight in the apartment above
him, and then a loud noise, like a body hitting the floor. He reported that he ran to
his apartment door just in time to see the defendant running down the stairs. One of
the jurors, himself an elderly man, reminded the others about the way the elderly wit-
ness had walked to the stand before testifying; dragging one of his feet, he walked in a
labored fashion, his gait slowed by some disability. It was an observation that would
have been missed if the only aspect of the witness that the jurors saw was his face.
Id. at 42 n.9.
90. Id. at 42-43.
91. Id.
92. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The Elev-
enth Circuit had considered VTC testimony before and allowed it, in Harrell v. Butter-
worth, 251 F.3d 926, 930 (11th Cir. 2001). In Harrell, however, VTC testimony was allowed
because the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied that the lower courts had properly applied the
Craig standard. Id.; see also Yates, 438 F.3d at 1313. It is noteworthy that Harrell was a
habeas case, and thus only required the court to decide whether the allowance of VTC was
"not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of, federal law as determined
by the Supreme Court." Yates, 438 F.3d at 1313.
A recently affirmed habeas case, with a tortured procedural history in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, also concluded that the Craig stan-
dard was controlling, and ultimately ordered habeas relief due to the state court's failure to
consider Craig. Gentry v. Deuth (Gentry 1), 381 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
vacated, 381 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. Ky. 2004), habeas motion granted, 381 F. Supp. 2d 634
(W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd, 456 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2006). In Gentry I, the federal district court
examined the constitutionality of a Kentucky state court's allowance of VTC testimony by
five expert witnesses against the defendant in a DUI and second-degree manslaughter
case. Gentry 1, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 616. After admonishing the relevant state courts for
their insufficient discussion of the Confrontation Clause, the court found Craig to be bind-
ing Supreme Court precedent in defendant Gentry's habeas petition. Id. at 622. Accord-
ingly, the court proceeded with an extensive discussion of Craig. Id. at 622-24. The court
highlighted Craig's requirement of a case-specific finding of necessity, and found that Ken-
tucky failed to make the requisite case-specific finding that VTC testimony by the five
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to travel to the United States to testify against the defendants, but were
willing to testify via VTC.93 The U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama allowed the testimony, and the defendants appealed.
9
4
Unlike the Second Circuit in Gigante, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
Craig rule, which requires the alternative form of testimony to be "neces-
experts was necessary for an important public policy. Id. at 624. Indeed, the witnesses
testified by VTC rather than in court only because the witnesses preferred not to make the
trip to court. Id. The federal court here again excoriated the state court: "The court made
no attempt to conduct an evidentiary hearing, nor did it make any specific findings regard-
ing the situation. At most, it simply offered that the legality of the two-way, closed circuit
television system was being litigated in the state courts." Id. Asserting that "[s]omething
more than a generalized notion of convenience, merely an implicit one at that, must be
shown before the preference for direct confrontation can be overcome," the federal district
court held that the use of VTC testimony was a violation of the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights. Id. at 624, 626.
In addition, the court rejected the prosecution's reliance on Gigante. Id. at 624-25. The
court emphasized that because Gentry's case was a habeas petition the court was only
concerned with Supreme Court precedent, not the decisions of intermediate federal courts.
Id. ("Gigante ... is not the clearly established precedent of the United States Supreme
Court. As such, the federal courts may not rely on it to brush aside what is clearly estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent."). Looking beyond the limited scope of law relevant in
habeas cases, the Gentry I court found unpersuasive the Gigante distinction between one-
way VTC testimony and two-way, much like the Eleventh Circuit in Yates. Id. at 625; see
also Yates, 438 F.3d at 1312-13. In arguing against this distinction, the Gentry I court em-
phasized the Supreme Court's 2002 rejection of the proposed amendment to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 26. Gentry 1, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26; see also infra notes 137-42
and accompanying text (discussing this rejection and the accompanying statements by the
Justices). Admitting that Justice Scalia's separate statement to Congress rejecting the
proposed amendment was not binding authority, the court nevertheless stated that it
would be "unwise to follow the same path as the Judicial Conference [the proponents of
the rule] and attempt to cling to Gigante with the hope that the strict requirements of Craig
can be avoided. They cannot." Gentry 1, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
Despite finding a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the Gentry I
court deemed the constitutional violation harmless error and upheld the defendant's con-
viction. Id. at 627. Two months later, however, the same court, in an opinion written by
the same judge, reversed itself, held that the VTC testimony was not harmless error, and
consequently issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Gentry v. Deuth (Gentry I), 381
F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (W.D. Ky. 2004). After serving her sentence, the defendant returned
to the federal district court to enforce the conditional habeas writ against the collateral
consequences of her criminal convictions, namely, the loss of her operator's license and her
registration as a convicted felon. Gentry v. Deuth (Gentry III), 381 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636
(W.D. Ky. 2004). Observing that the Commonwealth of Kentucky had failed to retry the
defendant and had abandoned its appeal of the earlier conditional habeas writ, the court
made the conditional writ absolute and overturned the defendant's conviction. Id. at 638.
Finally, in July 2006, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision against a juris-
dictional challenge. Gentry v. Deuth (Gentry IV), 456 F.3d 687, 690 (6th Cir. 2006).
93. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1310. The court could not force the witnesses to testify because
the witnesses were "beyond the government's subpoena powers." Id. The defendants in
Yates were defending themselves from a host of charges stemming from their operation of
an Internet pharmacy. Id. at 1309-10.
94. Id. at 1310.
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sary to further an important public policy." 95 The court in Yates could
find no compelling reason to use VTC testimony,96 and thus, without the
requisite important public policy, disallowed the use of VTC testimony.97
In Shabazz, the appeals court overturned the lower court's use of VTC
testimony because of a pressing, specific question of reliability.9 In Gi-
gante, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's use of VTC testi-
mony by extending Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
regarding depositions, to the use of VTC testimony and finding the re-
quirements of that rule satisfied. 99 In Nippon, the court allowed VTC
testimony because both parties consented, despite the court's hints that
VTC testimony might otherwise violate the Confrontation Clause.'0
And, finally, in Yates, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's
analogy to Rule 15 and instead applied the Craig rule to two-way VTC,
and held that VTC testimony violated the defendants' Confrontation
Clause rights because there had been no case-specific finding that VTC
was necessary to further an important public policy.'0 1 These cases illus-
trate that, without clear guidance from a federal rule of criminal proce-
dure, the federal courts have come to conflicting decisions via varying
rationales regarding the use of VTC testimony in criminal cases."'
II. RECONCILING VTC TESTIMONY WITH THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
A. VTC Testimony Limits a Defendant's Confrontation Clause Rights
Even courts that accept VTC testimony acknowledge that it limits a de-
fendant's right to confrontation. VTC allows for certain hallmarks of
confrontation -the witness can generally be seen by everyone in the
courtroom and the witness can be cross-examined in real time-but, for
several reasons, it is not true confrontation, and, thus, its use must be
allowed only in strictly limited situations.'°4
95. Id. at 1314. Craig also requires the alternative means of testimony to be reliable.
Id. (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990)).
96. Id. at 1318.
97. Id. at 1316-18.
98. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
102. See supra Part I.D.1.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38,42-43 (D. Mass. 1998).
104. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) ("[Olur precedents confirm that a
defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-
to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy....").
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1. The Word "Confronted"
The Sixth Amendment is plain: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."'' 5 The constitutionality of VTC testimony in criminal trials thus
turns on the word "confronted." And the Supreme Court seems to have
already rejected the argument that the definition of confront incorporates
a meeting via television."O Two individuals looking at two different tele-
vision screens in two different locations are simply not confronting each
other physically face-to-face-no matter what is on the screens. The
Constitution promises defendants more than just the right to look at
moving pictures of the witnesses against them. Because it fails to provide
actual confrontation17 the use of VTC testimony abridges the Confronta-
tion Clause rights of defendants, and consequently, its use should be
strictly limited in federal criminal cases. 1°8
2. Extra-Textual Concerns
VTC testimony raises more than just semantic questions regarding the
Confrontation Clause. It also presents questions that are both more con-
crete than the semantics issue (such as problems with transmission reli-
ability and sizes of television screens) and more esoteric (such as the psy-
chological impact of the medium on witnesses and jurors).1°9
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. Cf Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.) ("I cannot comprehend how one-way trans-
mission (which Craig says does not ordinarily satisfy confrontation requirements) becomes
transformed into full-fledged confrontation when reciprocal transmission is added. As we
made clear in Craig, a purpose of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accus-
ers to make their accusations in the defendant's presence-which is not equivalent to mak-
ing them in a room that contains a television set beaming electrons that portray the defen-
dant's image." (citations omitted)).
107. Justice Scalia stated: "Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones." Id.
108. E.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 ("[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory wit-
nesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where
denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.").
109. Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 769, 789 (2004). Judge Gertner inquired:
What information does it convey? What information is lost? What is its impact on
the atmosphere in the courtroom? To what degree does it hurt, or help the juror's
ability to understand trial issues? To what degree does it assist the jury in its role as
an active decisionmaker? And finally, what do we gain, or more importantly, lose,
when trials look like the evening news?
Id. Even the Second Circuit in Gigante, which upheld the use of VTC testimony, ex-
pressed concern that "[t]here may well be intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying in
a courtroom that are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony." United States v.
Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999).
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a. Psychological Concerns Regarding the Difference Between Televi-
sion and Reality
The use of VTC raises concerns about how differences between testi-
mony from a television and testimony from a physically present witness
might affect a jury's evaluation of the witness." The psychological sepa-
ration from reality provided by television is particularly important.1" As
Judge Gertner expressed in Nippon:
Real time testimony would provide the Court with the simultane-
ity of a live witness.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the advantages of video tele-
conferencing, especially as compared with video-taped deposi-
tions, [I] had serious concerns. The testimony of the witness
would still be mediated via videoscreen. Studies have suggested
that television and videoscreens necessarily present antiseptic,
watered down versions of reality. Much of the interaction of the
courtroom is missed.
1 12
Judge Gertner expanded on her concerns about the psychological im-
pact of VTC testimony at trial in 2004, at William and Mary's Interna-
tional Conference on the Legal and Policy Implications of Courtroom
Technology.113 In particular, she reiterated her earlier concerns regarding
the impact of VTC on a jury's ability to evaluate the witness and come to
a unified theory of the facts on which they could decide a defendant's
• 114
guilt or innocence. These psychological issues are not easily under-
stood, but it seems clear that there are psychological intangibles that dif-
ferentiate virtual confrontation via VTC from actual, physical confronta-
tion. 15
110. Gertner, supra note 109, at 773. Judge Gertner explained:
My concerns are grounded in part, but only in part, on the Constitution's Confron-
tation Clause.... [Mly concerns are also empirical, drawing on social science research
about communication, and my own experience. In fact, I want to consider the impact
of something decidedly old-fashioned .... I want to consider the impact of presenting
important testimony through videoconferencing on the "gravitas" of the courtroom.
Id.
111. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 1998) (foot-
note omitted) (citing L.J. Shrum, Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas C. O'Guinn, The Effects
of Television Consumption on Social Perceptions: The Use of Priming Procedures to Inves-
tigate Psychological Processes, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 447 (1998)).
113. Gertner, supra note 109, at 769.
114. Id. at 770.
115. See id. at 784-85; Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Con-
sideration of Today's-and Tomorrow's-High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV.
799, 835-36 (1998) ("Important testimony at trial is increasingly given by faces in televi-
sions, albeit live interactive faces, and we are beginning to see more and more remote




Concerns about the psychological impact of VTC are not simply limited
to how jurors may react to testimony that "look[s] like the evening
news.""' 6 Judge Gertner, at the forefront of the discussion related to the
propriety of VTC, has also expressed concern that VTC causes a signifi-
cant loss of courtroom formality. 7 She and other judges and commenta-
tors believe that this loss of courtroom formality harms the fact-finding
process."' For instance, Chief Judge Edmondson of the Eleventh Circuit
expressed grave concern in his original Yates concurrence about the in-
formality, and even the legality, of an oath administered internationally
over television." 9 The Tenth Circuit has similarly discussed how the for-
malities and pressures of stepping into a courtroom affect a witness and
his or her testimony.'20 Giving testimony via VTC lacks the pressure and
formality of testifying while actually sitting on the witness stand. Cross-
examination via VTC lacks the adversarial impact it enjoys in person
because the witness is separated from the cross-examining lawyer by dis-
tance and technology.'22 And, as Shabazz illustrated, a wide variety of
activities could occur off-camera that keep the witness disengaged from
the formality and pressure of trial, or even prompt the witness on how to
manness that has characterized our trials? Absent future experimental work, we cannot
even hazard a guess as to the reaction of jurors or the general public." (footnote omitted)).
116. Gertner, supra note 109, at 789.
117. Id. at 784. "Testimony in a courtroom, in the gravitas of that setting, has an im-
pact on all participants. We are used to looking at screens, in our bedrooms and living
rooms, our offices, the train station, in restaurants. The court, however, is different as seen
with [the ceremony's formality]." Id.
118. E.g., infra note 119 and accompanying text; see also Lederer, supra note 115, at
820 ("[T]ransmission... lacks the traditional judicial surroundings thought to convey the
seriousness of court testimony.").
119. United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 1182, 1189-91 (11th Cir. 2004) (Edmondson, C.J.,
concurring).
120. United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Will the formality
of the courtroom, the oath, and the penalties of perjury change the witness' decision?
What is the importance of the expected truthful testimony? What is the importance of
allowing witness intimidation to succeed? Any experienced trial attorney has encountered
a witness who has changed his testimony between the final interview and trial.").
121. E.g., Yates, 391 F.3d at 1191 (Edmondson, C.J., concurring) ("I mistrust the notion
that many people think that talking to a television... counts for much."); United States v.
Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[T]estimony of the witness
would still be mediated via videoscreen. Studies have suggested that television and video-
screens necessarily present antiseptic, watered down versions of reality. Much of the in-
teraction of the courtroom is missed." (footnote omitted)).
122. The Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly the importance of effective cross-
examination. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (plurality opinion); Cali-
fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (calling cross-examination "the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
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most effectively respond to cross-examination.'2 These concerns further
highlight the superiority of physical confrontation over the virtual con-
frontation provided by VTC.
c. Practical Differences
In addition to the psychological divide between television and reality
and the similar impact caused by a loss of courtroom formality, there are
practical elements of in-person testimony that are lost when VTC testi-
mony is used. 124 Most importantly, the camera cannot perceive, and the
television screen cannot display, many of the details that would be evi-
dent if the witness were physically in the courtroom.1 2 The jury's inabil-
ity to see the entire witness may limit its ability to evaluate that witness'
credibility and value as evidence-impairing an important function of the
jury in criminal trials.1 6 The Supreme Court has noted the fundamental
importance of avoiding the wrongful implication of defendants by wit-
nesses and the efficacy of face-to-face confrontation in achieving thislr
123. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999). In Gigante, the
defendant complained that the witness was unable to see him as the camera was pointed
solely at the defendant's attorney and not at the defendant. Id. at 80 n.1; see also United
States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555-57 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that two-way closed-
circuit television testimony by a child abuse victim violated the Craig rule and the Con-
frontation Clause). The Bordeaux court asked: "How big must the monitor be? Where
should it be placed? Where should the camera focused on the defendant be placed?" Id.
at 555; see also supra note 92.
125. See supra notes 89, 124 and infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
126. See Gertner, supra note 109, at 786. Judge Gertner states:
Studies have demonstrated that facial expressions-which video screens easily dis-
play-are the least "leaky"; that is, the easiest channel [of communication] to control
by the witness bent on deception; the body is less controllable or "leakier" than other
channels of communication; and the voice (speech hesitations, speech errors, and the
pitch of the speaker's voice) is the "leakiest" of the three channels. This was so [in
the studies] even with witnesses highly motivated to lie.
While videoscreens show all aspects-the face, the body, the voice-they do so
with varying degrees of success. Depending upon the quality of the transmission, you
see the witness's face, and hear the tone of voice. The screen necessarily limits the ju-
rors' ability to see the witness's body, and the relationship of all three channels of
nonverbal expression. Plainly, the image can be orchestrated-by decisions about
lighting, the size of the image, the perspective.
Nevertheless, whatever the combination, it is clear that in live testimony, face-to-
face transmission plainly increases the information available to the fact-finder ... de-
tection of deception is solely a function of the accessibility of the fact-finder to the
witness and his behavior.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
These purely practical concerns can be exacerbated by the use of VTC with foreign
witnesses. The Nippon jurors, for instance, reported great difficulty in following the VTC
testimony of the Japanese witnesses because of the language barrier, despite translation.
Id. at 788.
127. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,846 (1990).
[Vol. 56:683
A voiding Virtual Justice
but the limits of VTC technology can keep defendants and witnesses
from properly seeing each other-or even from seeing each other at all.""
Furthermore, the question of what is going on around the witness, out-
side of the camera's view, can cause entire testimony, and even a convic-
tion, to be thrown out, as in Shabazz.n 9 These practical issues are yet
more evidence that confrontation via VTC is imperfect confrontation at
best.
B. Competing Efforts at Reconciliation, the Proposed Amendment to Rule
26, and Crawford
While VTC testimony is neither the constitutional nor functional
equivalent of the testimony of physically present witnesses,"3 the Su-
preme Court has held repeatedly that the Confrontation Clause is not an
absolute guarantee of physical, face-to-face confrontation.131 With this
limited guidance, the federal courts have taken three different ap-
proaches to reconciling VTC testimony with the Confrontation Clause.
Courts holding that VTC testimony violates the Confrontation Clause
have generally based their decision on the rule announced in Craig, and
found the testimony unconstitutional because it was not necessary for an
important public policy.132 Alternatively, those allowing testimony by
VTC have either: (a) applied the Craig rule but with a different interpre-
tation of "necessary for an important public policy"; 133 or (b) looked to
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rule controlling
the use of depositions, for guidance.3 This dissonance stems from uncer-
128. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 80 & n.1. This problem includes not just picture clarity prob-
lems, but also, as in Gigante, situations where the witness simply cannot see the defendant
because the camera is not pointed at the defendant. Id. The Second Circuit was aware of
this issue, but ruled against the defendant because the defendant had waived his right to
have the camera pointing at him. Id.
129. United States v. Shabazz, 52 M.J. 585,594,595 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
130. See supra part II.A.
131. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 69 (1980); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-42 (1987); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
132. See, e.g., supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. But see Shabazz, 52 M.J. at
594 (finding reliability so lacking that the court did not need to choose between the Gi-
gante standard and the Craig standard).
133. Although the district court in Yates used the Craig rule, the circuit court found
that the district court misread the "important public purpose" requirement. United States
v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). "[T]he prosecutor's need for
the video conference testimony to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it," the Elev-
enth Circuit held, was not the sort of important public purpose required by the Craig rule,
despite such an averment by the district court. Id.
134. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, used by the Gigante court, limits the use
of depositions in federal criminal trials and states:
(A) When Taken.
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tainty about both the proper legal standard that should be applied and
the manner of its application."'
The Supreme Court's rejection of a proposed amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure may eliminate some of that uncertainty.
The majority of cases in which VTC testimony was found to be an ac-
ceptable limitation of the Confrontation Clause were decided before the
Supreme Court rejected the proposed amendment to Rule 26.16 This
amendment would have allowed VTC testimony without any showing
that it is necessary to further an important public policy, and instead
would have effectively codified Gigante's analogy to Rule 15 and deposi-
tion testimony.
1 3 1
(1) In General. A party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order
to preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion because of excep-
tional circumstances and in the interest of justice. If the court orders the deposition to
be taken, it may also require the deponent to produce at the deposition any desig-
nated material that is not privileged, including any book, paper, document, record, re-
cording, or data.
(e) Manner of Taking. Unless these rules or a court order provides otherwise, a
deposition must be taken and filed in the same manner as a deposition in a civil ac-
tion, except that:
(1) A defendant may not be deposed without that defendant's consent.
(2) The scope and manner of the deposition examination and cross-examination
must be the same as would be allowed during trial.
(3) The government must provide to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, for
use at the deposition, any statement of the deponent in the government's possession
to which the defendant would be entitled at trial.
FED R. CRIM. P. 15.
The federal courts generally do not favor presenting evidence by depositions. The
district judge in Nippon explained that videotaped depositions are "the exception and not
the rule," and that "should these events occur with any regularity, trial by deposition
would substitute for trial by confrontation, precisely what the Confrontation Clause was
designed to avoid." United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D. Mass.
1998) (citing Stoner v. Sowders, 97 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993)).
135. See supra Part I.D.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 75 (2d Cir. 1999).
137. See Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89, 93 (statement of Scalia, J.). The theory behind the proposed amendment was
inspired by Gigante. Id. at 94. The proponents of the amendment believed that VTC was
an attractive alternative to depositions that preserved confrontation because it was two-
way, unlike the one-way, closed circuit television in Craig. Id. The proposed rule would
have read as follows:
Rule 26. Taking Testimony
(a) In General. In every trial the testimony of witnesses must be taken in open
court, unless otherwise provided by a statute or by rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§
2072-77.
(b) Transmitting Testimony from a Different Location. In the interest of justice,
the court may authorize contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in open court
of testimony from a witness who is at a different location if:
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In joining the Court's decision to reject the proposed rule, Justice
Scalia filed a separate statement that provides some guidance about the
reasoning of the otherwise silent majority. 138 Justice Scalia argued that
the proposed amendment's limitations on the use of VTC testimony were
insufficient.'39 In addition to Justice Scalia's statement, Justice Breyer,
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional circumstances for such transmis-
sion;
(2) appropriate safeguards for the transmission are used; and
(3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(4)-(5).
Id. app. at 99 (dissenting statement of Breyer, J.). In addition to acknowledging its reli-
ance on Gigante and the distinction between one-way and two-way VTC, the committee
suggested several procedural safeguards in its accompanying committee note, but insisted
any such safeguards would be in the discretion of the trial court:
Deciding what safeguards are appropriate is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. The Committee envisions that in establishing those safeguards the court will be
sensitive to a number of key issues. First, it is important that the procedure maintain
the dignity and decorum normally associated with a federal judicial proceeding....
Second, it is important to insure the quality and integrity of the two-way transmission
itself.... Third, the court may wish to use a surrogate, such as an assigned marshal or
special master, as used in Gigante, to appear at the witness's location to ensure that
the witness is not being influenced from an off-camera source .... Fourth, the court
should ensure that the court, counsel, and jurors can clearly see and hear the witness
during the transmission [and vice versa] .... Fifth, the court should ensure that the re-
cord reflects the persons who are present at the witness's location. Sixth, the court
may wish to require that representatives of the parties be present at the witness's loca-
tion. Seventh, the court may inquire of counsel, on the record, whether additional
safeguards might be employed. Eighth, the court should probably preserve any re-
cording of the testimony, should a question arise about the quality of the transmis-
sion. Finally, the court may consider issuing a pretrial order setting out the appropri-
ate safeguards employed under the rule.
Id. app. at 102-03 (citation omitted).
The reliance on Gigante rather than Craig and the distinction between one-way and
two-way VTC seem to have been the Supreme Court's key reasons for rejecting the pro-
posed amendment. See infra note 139. Leaving procedural safeguards to the discretion of
trial courts may also insufficiently protect a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, but
the Court did not explicitly indicate that sentiment in its rejection of the amendment. See
generally Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89 (failing to discuss the issue of procedural safeguards).
138. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. at 93-96 (statement of Scalia, J.).
139. Id. at 94. Justice Scalia stated:
I cannot comprehend how one-way transmission (which Craig says does not ordinarily
satisfy confrontation requirements) becomes transformed into full-fledged confronta-
tion when reciprocal transmission is added. As we made clear in Craig, a purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their accusations in
the defendant's presence-which is not equivalent to making them in a room that con-
tains a television set beaming electrons that portray the defendant's image. Virtual
confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt
whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.
Id. (citation omitted).
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joined by Justice O'Connor, separately dissented from the Court's deci-
sion to reject the amendment.'" The dissent argued that allowing VTC
testimony under a deposition standard is reasonable, and that the
amended rule would satisfy Craig.14' As with Justice Scalia's statement,
the dissent illustrates that the Court seemed to accept the Craig rule as
the proper rule -although the dissent believed the proposed amendment
was at least as good as the Craig rule.' 42 The rejection of the proposed
amendment strongly suggests that the standard for allowing VTC testi-
mony should be the higher "case-specific finding of necessity for an im-
portant public policy" standard rather than the "exceptional circum-
stances" standard; the Eleventh Circuit's Yates decision is further evi-
dence of this.43
Despite the Supreme Court's statements when the Court rejected pro-
posed Rule 26, the proper standard for allowing VTC testimony is still
unclear.'" Certainly the rejection of the 2002 amendment to Rule 26
strongly suggests that any new rule must require more than the proposed
amendment's exceptional circumstances test.45 But, unfortunately, that
does not transform into a uniform federal rule or Supreme Court decision
that provides lower federal courts with sufficient guidance regarding the
acceptable use of VTC testimony in criminal trials.' 46 Furthermore, even
if the only interpretation of the Supreme Court's rejection of proposed
140. Id. at 96 (dissenting statement of Breyer, J.).
141. Id. at 96-97.
142. Id.
Justice Scalia believes that the present proposal does not much concern itself with the
limitations on the use of out-of-court statements set forth in Maryland v. Craig .... I
read the Committee's discussion differently .... [Tihe Committee refers to Maryland
v. Craig five times. It begins by stating that "arguably" its test is "at least as stringent
as the standard set out in [that case]." It devotes a lengthy paragraph to explaining
why it believes that its proposal satisfies Craig ....
Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). Justice Breyer also points to the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Harrell as support for the sufficiency of the proposed
amendment. Id. at 97. However, the Eleventh Circuit itself later stated, in Yates, that it
considered Harrell to have properly applied the Craig standard of a case-specific finding of
necessity for an important public policy-not the lower standard of exceptional circum-
stances envisioned in the proposed amendment Justice Breyer championed. United States
v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
143. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314-15 (discussing the Supreme Court's 2002 rejection of the
proposed Rule 26(b)).
144. If it were certain, one would not have seen the frequent, competing comparisons
in Yates between Rule 15 depositions and VTC testimony. E.g., Yates, 438 F.3d at 1336
(Marcus, J., dissenting) ("The Confrontation Clause expresses no preference between
substitute methods that place the defendant in the physical presence of the witness, such as
Rule 15 depositions, and methods where the defendant is not physically present, such as
two-way video testimony.").
145. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part I.D.
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Rule 26 is that the Craig standard must apply, the Court did not provide
any guidance concerning what important public policies a rule limiting
VTC testimony should consider.
147
The application of Crawford to VTC could also confuse any of the clar-
ity provided by the rejection of proposed Rule 26. The dissenting opin-
ions in Yates both argued that, because the witnesses testifying via VTC
were unavailable (because they were beyond the subpoena power of the
court),148 and because Crawford only requires prior opportunity for cross-
examination in order to admit the testimonial evidence of unavailable
witnesses, the VTC testimony in Yates was constitutional because the
unavailable witnesses were cross-examined.149 Both dissents added that
Craig was inapplicable because in Craig, the witness was available, unlike
the witnesses in Yates"5 Accordingly, it seems that a constitutional rule
regarding VTC based on Crawford would only require a witness to be
unavailable,' and that VTC allow for the cross-examination of that un-
available witness.
With a variety of approaches taken by the lower federal courts, and
limited, possibly even conflicting, Supreme Court guidance, the need to
establish an unambiguous uniform rule reconciling the Confrontation
Clause with VTC testimony is abundantly clear.
III. WHAT RULE SHOULD APPLY, AND How SHOULD IT BE APPLIED?
The use of VTC testimony in federal criminal trials raises questions
about the text and meaning of the Confrontation Clause and about how
well VTC can satisfy the clause's fundamental guarantee. Any federal
rule of criminal procedure or definitive Supreme Court decision must
minimize the impact of VTC testimony on a criminal defendant's Con-
frontation Clause rights. Federal criminal VTC jurisprudence has devel-
oped three potential rules: (1) Gigante's unavailable witness and excep-
tional circumstances standard; (2) the Yates dissents' unavailable witness
and cross-examination standard based on Crawford; and (3) Craig's case-
specific finding that VTC is necessary for an important public policy stan-
dard.
147. See generally Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 207 F.R.D. 89 (2002) (making no mention of what may or may not be an important
public policy).
148. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1326 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); id. at 1336 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1329-33, 1336 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1326 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); id. at 1331 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1329-33 (Marcus, J., dissenting). Judge Marcus defined unavailability as the
failure of good faith efforts by the prosecution to bring the witness to trial. Id. at 1336.
The Second Circuit in Gigante looked to Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The Gigante standard has already been rejected by the Supreme Court
as being "of dubious validity under the Confrontation Clause.', 5 2 The
Gigante standard relies on an analogy to depositions, but the analogy
fails.'53 At a deposition, the defendant is physically in the same place as
the witness and able to confront the witness face-to-face,' T thus satisfying
the defendant's right to confrontation. This does not hold true for VTC
testimony.' Furthermore, the rule's exceptional circumstances require-
ment is insufficient.5 6 Such a requirement is reminiscent of the compel-
ling circumstances requirement that has been ineffective in federal civil
trials; and such ineffectiveness in criminal trials would likely lead to fre-
quent, unacceptable violations of defendants' rights.57 Even the Supreme
Court Justices who supported the codification of the Gigante standard
recognized that Craig is the ultimate touchstone of VTC's constitutional-
ity.58 Considering all of this, it should be expected that the only standard
that will withstand Supreme Court review is the Craig rule and, as such,
the Gigante rule must be rejected.
Although the Crawford-based test that the Yates dissenters advocated
was developed after the rejection of proposed Rule 26, the statements of
Justices Scalia and Breyer illustrate the inadequacy of such a test, and the
imperative of employing the Craig test to two-way VTC.' 9 The Yates
dissenters relied on the jurisprudence of hearsay in their argument,'60 but
152. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89 at 93 (statement of Scalia, J.).
153. Id. at 94-95; Yates, 438 F.3d at 1312-13.
154. FED R. CRIM. P. 15(c).
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. Cf. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. at 94 (statement of Scalia, J.).
157. Compare United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the
exceptional circumstances requirement is met simply by the materiality of an unavailable
witness' testimony), with FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., 197 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2000)
(citing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000); Alderman v. SEC, 104 F.3d
285 (9th Cir. 1997); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publ'ns, 756 F. Supp. 1393
(D. Or. 1990), affd sub nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir.
1993)) (recognizing the unimportance of the compelling circumstances requirement); see
also infra notes 168-69.
158. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. at 96-97 (dissenting statement of Breyer, J.) ("Justice Scalia believes that the pre-
sent proposal does not much concern itself with the limitations on the use of out-of-court
statements set forth in Maryland v. Craig.... I read the Committee's discussion differently
.... [T]he Committee refers to Maryland v. Craig five times. It begins by stating that
'arguably' its test is 'at least as stringent as the standard set out in [that case].' It devotes a
lengthy paragraph to explaining why it believes that its proposal satisfies Craig.... .
159. See infra notes 160-63.
160. E.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1325-27 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (finding fault in majority's analysis of "the testimony as if it were
given in court, as opposed to what it really is-hearsay").
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VTC testimony is transmitted in real-time into the courtroom-it is con-
temporaneous testimony imperfectly confronted, not a prior hearsay
statement subject to Crawford.6' Moreover, the test proposed by the
Yates dissenters distinguishes the facts of Craig and declaims its test. 62
Yet, Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer, and even the proponents of the re-
jected Rule 26 all seem in agreement that Craig must be considered.' A
test based on Crawford would overextend the definition of hearsay and
ignore significant statements about the importance of Craig in evaluating
live testimony from a witness not present in the courtroom.
It is the Craig rule that should be applied to VTC testimony.'64 The
reasoning expressed by both Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer in the Su-
preme Court's rejection of the proposed amendment to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure illustrates this point.16 The "neces-
sary to further an important public policy" standard is by no means lim-
ited to the facts of Craig: as the Supreme Court has explicitly stated in
Craig and in Coy v. Iowa, and strongly suggested in its rejection of the
proposed Rule 26, any time a defendant cannot physically confront an
accusatory witness, that exception to the Confrontation Clause must be
necessary for an important public policy.' 66 And thus, because VTC does
not allow a defendant to physically confront accusatory witnesses, this
standard must apply. By strictly limiting the use of confrontation via
VTC in place of physical confrontation, the Craig rule best strikes the
161. See id. at 1314 n.4 (majority opinion) ("No doubt the Government passes on this
[hearsay] argument because it recognizes that Crawford applies only to testimonial state-
ments made prior to trial, and the live two-way video testimony at issue in this case was
presented at trial."); Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 207 F.R.D. at 94 (statement of Scalia, J.) (distinguishing between live testimony given
by a witness during a trial from outside the courtroom and out out-of-court prior state-
ments); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992).
162. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1325-26 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (arguing that the application of
the Craig test is inappropriate because VTC testimony is hearsay and thus not in the same
"constitutional context" as Craig); id. at 1332 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
facts of Yates were "so far removed from the original scope of Craig as to render Craig
inapplicable").
163. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. at 93-95 (statement of Scalia, J.); id. at 96-99 (dissenting statement of Breyer, J.); id.
app. at 99-104 (quoting the advisory committee notes explaining the constitutional theory
of the proposed amendment to Rule 26 and citing Craig repeatedly).
164. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
166. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) ("[O]ur precedents confirm that a
defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-
to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy...." (emphasis added)); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021
(1988) (noting that exceptions to the Confrontation Clause should apply "only when nec-
essary to further an important public policy"); see also Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. at 93-94 (statement of Scalia, J.).
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necessary balance between VTC testimony and the Confrontation
Clause.
When it comes to application of this rule, it is fundamentally important
that it is not as flexibly or creatively interpreted as Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,67 as such flexibility is likely to result in "neces-
sity" or "important public purpose" being read out of the rule.168 Fur-
thermore, it should be emphasized that the conviction of more criminals,
the convenience of witnesses, and the concepts of general efficiency and
expedience are not important public policies within the meaning of the
169
rule. Important public policies, such as the maintenance of a witness'
physical safety, should, on the other hand, be expressly considered.7
167. See Adam v. Carvalho, 138 F. App'x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2005); Beltran-Tirado v. INS,
213 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2000); Alderman v. SEC, 104 F.3d 285,288 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Ninth Circuit focused on the witness' taking of an oath, subjection to cross-
examination, and out-of-state location. While this approach seemed to reflect the goals of
the American adversarial process, such a test abrogates a clear rule of procedure. The
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 require "good cause
shown in compelling circumstances" for the use of VTC testimony, not simply a sworn,
out-of-state witness who is subject to cross examination. FED. R. CIV. P. 43 advisory com-
mittee's note. Any proposed federal rule of criminal procedure or Supreme Court decision
regarding VTC must take into account the danger or such flexible interpretation and guard
against it. It is undesirable, at best, to have the lower federal courts reading away the
requirements of a federal rule of criminal procedure, or even suggesting that the drafters
are just wrong, as the court in Swedish Match did in the civil context. FTC v. Swedish
Match N. Am., 197 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2000) ("I appreciate that the Advisory Committee
Notes... are more hostile than I am .... [T]he courts are much more receptive to this new
technology than the Advisory Committee."). Therefore, Swedish Match and the Ninth
Circuit cases illustrate that any federal rule or Supreme Court decision should be clear and
strict in order to discourage any creative interpretation.
168. See, e.g., Carvalho, 133 F. App'x at 8 (disregarding the compelling circumstances
requirement).
169. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[M]ore convictions of
guilty defendants ... is not an unworthy interest, but it should not be dressed up as a hu-
manitarian one."); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
("[U]nder the circumstances of this case ... the prosecutor's need for the video conference
testimony to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public policies
that are important enough to outweigh the Defendants' rights to confront their accusers
face-to-face.").
170. Although this Comment has argued for rejecting the Gigante test based on Rule
15 in favor of the Craig important public policy test, the ultimate result in Gigante would
likely have been the same under the Craig test. The allowance of VTC testimony in Gi-
gante certainly seemed necessary to protect the physical safety of the witness. United
States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing a witness in the last stages of
inoperable cancer and under the protection of the Federal Witness Protection Program to
testify against an alleged member of the Mafia via VTC). In Craig, the Supreme Court
considered the witness' emotional safety as an important public policy. Craig, 497 U.S. at
857 (holding that protecting a child witness from trauma is an important public policy that
passes constitutional muster). The protection of a witness' physical health and safety
ought to be considered. Assuming this, it seems likely that the Second Circuit in Gigante
would have found the Craig standard satisfied, just as it did the standard under Rule 15.
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It also remains absolutely vital to ensure the reliability of all VTC tes-
timony.17' And reliability means more than assuring that no one off-
camera is prompting the witness. Reliability concerns should primarily
be focused on retaining as many elements of actual confrontation as pos-
sible. 1 2  This includes a guaranteed opportunity to cross-examine any
witness testifying by VTC, utilizing VTC so that all involved (especially
the jury, the defendant, and the witness) may see and hear as much of
each other as possible and as clearly as possible, and ensuring that the
The same is true of the Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Benson, which relied on the
Gigante decision rather than the Craig test. United States v. Benson, 79 F. App'x 813, 821
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[t]he same reasoning applies in this case" as in Gigante). As
in Gigante, the appellate issue in Benson was, inter alia, the use of the VTC testimony of a
witness incapable of travel. Id. at 820. The defendants (who had been convicted of a Ponzi
scheme by the trial court) challenged the VTC testimony of 85-year-old Zelda Greger. Id.
at 821. Ms. Greger suffered from extensive health problems, and was under the care of a
gastrologist after serious stomach surgery left her underweight and fatigued. Id. at 820-21.
Although the Sixth Circuit eschewed the Craig standard of a case-specific finding of neces-
sity for the accomplishment of an important public policy in favor of the less rigorous Gi-
gante standard, it emphasized that Ms. Greger had testified in district court about her
serious health problems and her inability to travel. Id. The Sixth Circuit was satisfied that
it would have been physically dangerous for Ms. Greger to testify in court and approved
the use of VTC. Id. at 821.
A third case, albeit in a state court, also focused on the inability of the witness to testify
in court due to physical safety concerns. See State v. Sewell, 595 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999). In Sewell, a Minnesota murder case, the defendant appealed his conviction
on the grounds that, inter alia, the use of VTC violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Id.
at 209. In Sewell, the challenged testimony was given via VTC by William Hurt, a resident
of Arizona who had recently undergone surgery for a broken neck. Id. at 211. Mr. Hurt's
doctor informed the trial court that travel from Arizona to Minnesota would result in Mr.
Hurt's inability to return to Arizona for three months, which would interfere with a neces-
sary second surgery. Id. The trial court ruled that Mr. Hurt was unable to testify in court
because of this serious medical issue. Id. at 211, 213. On appeal, the defendant did not
challenge this ruling. Id. The appellate court was satisfied with this finding and the trial
court's reliance on Minnesota rules and federal civil rules regarding depositions in its al-
lowance of VTC testimony. Id. at 211-13. The Minnesota court stressed the demand of
reliability and the four substantive goals of the Confrontation Clause as set forth by the
Supreme Court in Craig. Id. at 212-13. This focus on the substantive goals of the Confron-
tation Clause has been rejected since the Sewell decision. See supra note 63 and accompa-
nying text. Nevertheless, the result in Sewell, Gigante, and Benson, might ultimately be the
same because the courts very likely would find that VTC testimony was necessary for an
important public purpose.
In Craig, the Supreme Court was satisfied that protecting a child from emotional harm
was a sufficiently important public policy. It seems to follow that protecting witnesses
from physical harm, as in Gigante, Benson, and Sewell, should satisfy any VTC Confronta-
tion Clause test based on Craig. Cf Craig, 497 U.S. at 855 ("[P]rotecting child witnesses
from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use
of a special procedure.").
171. Cf. supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text; see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (not-
ing further that "the reliability of the testimony [must be] otherwise assured").
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
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judge is available to rule on objections. Essentially, courts must take
every step to make VTC testimony as identical to in-person testimony as
possible. 7" Unfortunately, the other issues-the intangibles that concern
Judge Gertner and others-do not lend themselves to such analysis.
Rather, as Judge Gertner suggests, they should be the subjects of signifi-
cant psychological study.75
Ultimately, any federal rule of criminal procedure or Supreme Court
decision regarding VTC testimony should meet two major goals. First,
the rule must allow the admission of VTC testimony only upon a case-
specific finding that it is necessary to further an important public policy
(which does not include prosecutorial expedience or witness conven-
ience), or upon a defendant's consent. And second, the rule must ensure
that when trial courts employ VTC testimony, they use the technology in
a manner that emulates to the fullest possible extent testimony given by a
physically present witness, and thus preserve as many elements of actual
confrontation as possible.
The federal courts recognize that VTC does not perfectly satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, but it is nevertheless a valuable tool for introduc-
ing testimony at trial in a manner as similar as possible to testimony given
by a physically present witness. 6 Because of its significant value in cer-
tain circumstances, VTC testimony should not be banned outright, but
because it does not provide for actual face-to-face confrontation,' 77 there
must be strict limits on its use.17" The best rule would allow VTC testi-
mony only upon a case-specific finding that the VTC testimony is neces-
sary to achieve an important public policy (such as protecting a witness'
physical health and well-being), or upon a defendant's consent. Any
lesser standard impermissibly sacrifices a defendant's confrontation right
and the basic importance of testimony by physically present witnesses on
the altar of prosecutorial expediency and witness convenience. At the
other extreme, an absolute ban on VTC testimony ignores the value of a
limited and careful application of this powerful technology.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tension between opportunities afforded by VTC testimony and the
traditions and safeguards of the American criminal justice system has yet
173. E.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46.
174. Cf. id at 846 (holding that it takes "the rigorous adversarial testing that is the
norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings" to satisfy the Sixth Amendment).
175. Gertner, supra note 109, at 789.
176. See supra note 1; see also United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding that VTC allowed for otherwise unavailable testimony to be received in court
subject to cross-examination).
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See supra Part III.
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to be satisfactorily resolved. Federal courts are far from unanimous in
their approaches to resolving this tension. 179 Unanimity is, however, de-
sirable.'8 A federal rule of criminal procedure or a Supreme Court deci-
sion could create this unanimity.18' A Supreme Court decision on consti-
tutional grounds, rather thanjust an amendment to the federal criminal
rules, however, could also standardize the implementation of VTC by the
fifty states, which have been utilizing the technology to varying degrees.
8 2
A Supreme Court decision might also reign in any tendencies to expan-
sively read a federal rule of criminal procedure by publishing the Su-
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. One of the main purposes of the original establishment of all the various federal
rules was to establish uniformity throughout the federal judiciary. E.g., Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460,472 (1965); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir.
1963); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (E.D. Ky. 1980). If uni-
formity was not desirable, uniform rules would not have been imposed on the federal
courts.
181. See United States v. Whitted, 454 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have "the force and effect of law and are binding
upon the lower federal courts"); see also United States v. Igoe, 331 F.2d 766, 768 (7th Cir.
1964); Ochoa v. United States, 167 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1948). Decisions of the Supreme
Court involving federal law, obviously, are binding precedent on the entire federal judici-
ary. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 413 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[lIt certainly is
not our role.., to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court or even to anticipate such an
overruling by the Court." (emphasis added)); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308
(4th Cir. 2005) ("[O]ur duty 'is not to predict what the Supreme Court might do but rather
to follow what it has done."' (quoting West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752, 757
(4th Cir. 1998))); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2001) ("It is our role to
apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop."); Kitowski v.
United States, 931 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e clearly have no authority to
overrule a decision of the [United States] Supreme Court" (emphasis added)).
182. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the Guil-
lotine?: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 78-79 (2002);
Charles Wood, It's a Busy Year in Videoconferencing for Montana Lawyers, MONT. LAW.,
June-July 2005, at 7, 7; supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Ashdown and Menzel
give a succinct comparison of California, Missouri, and Florida in their article:
[U]nder a California statute, only initial appearances and arraignments may be con-
ducted via video. In contrast, a Missouri statute permits the use of video teleconfer-
ences for initial appearances, waiver of preliminary hearings, arraignment on an in-
formation or indictment where a plea of not guilty is entered, any pretrial or post-trial
proceeding that does not permit the cross-examination of witnesses, and sentencing
after a plea of guilty. Under the California statute, defendants must execute a written
waiver before they can make their initial appearance or be arraigned by video tele-
conference. In Missouri, waiver is required only for arraignments where the defen-
dant will enter a plea of guilty and sentencings following a conviction at trial; the de-
fendant's consent is not required for all other video proceedings authorized under the
Missouri statute. In Florida, the law regarding video proceedings is more restrictive
than in California with respect to the procedures that can be conducted by video, lim-
iting the use of video proceedings to arraignments, but the law is less restrictive with
respect to the consent required of the defendant.
Ashdown & Menzel, supra, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
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preme Court's rationale for its announced rule.183 On the other hand, a
Supreme Court decision could be less flexible than a federal rule, and
might keep courts from taking advantage of future technological ad-
vancements that could significantly improve the quality of confrontation
allowed by VTC. 84 Regardless, a uniform rule such as that proposed in
this Comment is needed in federal criminal trials.
VTC testimony will not be the last time technology has the potential to
change justice in the United States. The manner in which VTC testimony
is incorporated into federal criminal trials could influence how new tech-
nology will be viewed and assimilated by courts in the future. This con-
sideration makes any final decision about the use of VTC testimony all
the more important.
183. A definitive statement by the Court would prevent a failure of uniformity akin to
the courts' interpretation of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That is, the
failure of uniformity that has resulted from federal courts interpreting the rule however
they see fit, which has led to results opposite to those that the drafters of the rule intended.
Cf. supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
184. The Court would have more difficulty overturning a constitutional decision than it
would amending a federal rule. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 429
(2000) ("[E]ven in constitutional cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persua-
sive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by
some special justification." (quotations omitted)), with Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89 (2002) (containing nearly 300 pages of changes to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for that year).
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